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“Sowing peace and reaping hope”: The reintegration camp for former FARC combatants at Tierra Grata, Cesar
After more than 50 years of armed conflict, the Colombian government finally signed a peace agreement with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in 2016, during Juan Manuel Santos’s administration. This agreement led to serious challenges that the country still faces. The FARC was the guerrilla group that was founded under the principles and values of Marxist-Leninist ideology. At the beginning, this group was led by small farmers and workers that struggled for more control over lands and more rights in order to make Colombia free of inequalities. However, according to the BBC (2016), the FARC was seen as a threat to big landowners and the state, so the state decided to send the army to disband the group in Marquetalia in central Tolima (where some of the first FARC members were established). The FARC stated that it was after the clashes with the army in Marquetalia that they decided to take weapons. Due to their struggle needing financiation, in 1990 the FARC began involvement in the trafficking of drugs. Following many years of violent conflict, the organization had several reasons in order to be part of the 2016 agreement. Its troops were decreasing in personnel; the state during President Uribe’s government-led several operations that hit the organization of the group, especially because the Colombian state had the financial and training support of the US. The signing of the peace agreement between Colombia and the FARC was made on November 24th, 2016. The Colombian State and the FARC signed a lengthy document of over 300 pages, that sealed the route to peace the country was to follow over the next 20 years (Open Democracy, 2019). An important aspect in order to understand the peace agreement in Colombia is the former combatants of the guerrilla organization, which is the group that this article will focus on.
The peace agreement established disarmament, demobilization, and eventual reintegration of the FARC’s membership. According to Colombian Peace (2020) 13,104 FARC members formally demobilized, and about 800 rejected the peace agreement entirely and refused to participate in the process. It is necessary to express that the peace agreement gave the former combatants the opportunities provided by peace, however, they are facing many security risks and difficulties with their reintegration. Therefore, this article will focus on the political and social contributions that they have made during their reintegration, the challenges and threats facing the ex-combatants, society’s acceptance of these groups, as well as referring to advances by former combatants in Colombian society.
First of all, one of the main points of the peace agreement with the FARC is to give the former combatants and their families a new purpose in their lives. For this reason, the country has implemented a series of public policies that aim to lessen the consequences of the armed conflict. In this framework, it is evident how the reintegration process creates spaces where former combatants can return to their civilian lives, being accompanied in terms of behavior and insertion into society; likewise, it provides job opportunities, education, and health services that allow for a closing of the cycle of violence. This can be observed with comments from Carlos Ruiz Massieu, leader of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, who mentioned that the peace agreement has a significant positive impact on Colombian democracy, which was demonstrated by the increased participation and improved security in the regional elections of October 2019. On the other hand, the peace agreement has brought a series of political and social implications, such as the creation of 23 Transitional Vertical Normalization Zones and 8 camps where former combatants would be located; likewise, a political party founded by the FARC was established where its members are guaranteed 5 seats in the House of Representatives and 5 in the Senate in the event they do not reach the required votes in the next two legislatures. As for performance in the elections so far, it has been very limited. After laying down their arms, it has been difficult to convince Colombians of their passage to legality. Even though quite a few former combatants have aspired to political office, their election has been complicated by the lack of citizen votes. Nonetheless, one of the most significant and hopeful developments was the election of Julián Conrado as the first former combatant to lead a race for mayor (Turbaco-Bolívar) by popular vote, even though he did not run for the FARC party.
Second, while the signing of the peace accord was a historic milestone for the country, a peace agreement does not end political disagreements, nor does it immediately eradicate armed violence. In that sense, there are elementary problems of stigmatization as well as security, the latter linked to dissidents and illegal armed groups such as the ELN (a separate guerrilla organization with ties to the drug trade), Clan del Golfo (AGC: illegal group which originated from former AUC paramilitaries and are heavily involved in the drug trade) in addition to violence against former members of the FARC-EP and human rights leaders. However, it would not be the first time that a peace initiative in Colombia has been overshadowed by violence. The years 1984-2002 saw the systematic extermination of the Unión Patriótica (UP) and, with it, the failure of the peace accords concluded during the Belisario Betancur government. The UP emerged in 1985 as a political movement resulting from the negotiation process promoted by the then president, Belisario Betancur, and the FARC (Cepeda, 2006, p.101). Nonetheless, from its inception, the UP was directly targeted by state agents and paramilitary groups whose goal was to eliminate it. Thus, between 1984 and 2002, 4,153 victims belonging to the UP were murdered, kidnapped, or disappeared (Centro de Memoria Histórica, 2018, p.108). In short, this genocide was part of the process of annihilation of opposition political forces.
Now, the second point of the current agreement also raises the political participation of ex-combatants as an indispensable condition for building peace. Therefore, in September 2017, the FARC formed a new political party called Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común. Even so, some candidates were unable to exercise their political rights due to the insecurity and stigmatization they faced as members of the former guerrilla group; some were even forced to withdraw (Kroc Institute, 2019, p. 58). Unfortunately, ex-combatants do not have effective security guarantees. Currently, 132 cases of homicides of former combatants are being investigated and, with respect to attempted homicides, as of May 2019, the attorney general’s office was investigating 16 cases (CINEP and CERAC, 2019, p.64). Furthermore, 2019 was the deadliest year for former FARC combatants, with 77 murders, a figure that, based on the homicide rate, is approximately 23 times higher than the national average (Kroc Institute, 2019). In this regard, the pattern of murders and attacks against former FARC members is a major threat to the peace process. Even the assassinations of social leaders represent devastating consequences for the implementation process. In the day-to-day running of the peace process, the leaders have been bridges in the relationship between the government and the communities. An example of this are the leaders involved in the Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito (National Crop Substitution Program or PNIS for its initials in Spanish; this program was part of the 2016 peace agreement as a solution to the issue of illegal crops feeding the drug trade). However, there has also been a dynamic of violence against them, to the extent that 56 leaders and 29 participants of the PNIS were murdered during May 2017 and January 2020, which not only generates fear but also weakens the substitution process (Kroc Institute, 2019, p.68). In summary, the process of implementing the Final Accord has included and includes a complex path for ex-combatants as well as rural and social leaders attempting to aid its implementation
Last but not least, for more than 50 years, the country has been immersed in an internal conflict, surrounded by death, fear, and memory, leading many to believe that it is impossible to forgive people who have affected us. But today, in Colombia, we see a new path to peace. Examples of this have been the apologies by the FARC for kidnappings, the initiatives of former combatants including ecotourism, and other meaningful activities. The coordinator of the CNMH’s Memory Initiatives, Vladimir Melo, comments that these projects allow “the recognition of combatants as complex beings in their motivations, experiences, and expectations. The importance of building a plural memory, which integrates the voices and stories of the different people who have participated in the armed conflict, in order to be able to listen to each other and make peace viable”. After having initially denied forced recruitment of minors, the former FARC rebels decided to give apologies to victims. Carlos Antonio Lozada, a former top FARC commander, confessed that kidnapping, forced abortions, and recruitment of minors, only left wounds on people who were part of this bloody conflict. Thus, this apology was part of the reconciliation and reparation process, where they must recognize their crimes during the armed conflict. It is of course important to keep in mind that they are confessing what they did in order to reduce sentences. However, the families of the victims have said that rather than an apology, they want to know the truth. On the other hand, we can identify one of many activities that former combatants are developing: the ETCR or Territorial Training and Reincorporation Spaces. These are areas of temporary location created by the government for ex-combatants of the FARC-EP. They are usually located in rural areas, with 1 in Cesar, 2 in Caquetá, 3 in Cauca, 2 in Nariño, 5 in Antioquia, and some others. At the same time, there is tourism in these areas so that people can learn more about the lives of ex-combatants during the years of conflict. In some cases, such as Tierra Grata in the department of Cesar, tourists can spend the night there and do activities such as hiking and nature walks, as they are located in places where you can explore the flora and fauna. Activities like this are constantly showing us that we can have big structural changes in Colombia despite all the struggles. It is a slow process, but if the government and the society are engaged with the peace accord, then we can achieve this and more.
In order to conclude, it is necessary to restate that the peace agreement led to serious challenges that are taking place all over the State. It is evident that the peace agreement creates space where former combatants have different opportunities in order to return to their civilian lives. However, former combatants have been affected by the violence, insecurity, and stigmatization since the signing of the agreement, so these negative aspects have been hindering the full development of the Colombian peace agreement, which requires the full commitment of government and citizens in order to build peace. In the words of the Special Representative of The UN in Colombia, Carlos Ruiz Massieu, peace will not be fully achieved if former combatants, who surrendered their weapons and are committed to their reintegration process, continue to be murdered. The targeting of ex-combatants should therefore not only be seen as an attack on the ex-combatants, or on the peace agreement but also as an attack on Colombia and its future.
*Article researched and written by Maria Camila Bustamente, Ruth Fontalvo, Emely Guerrero & Marycarmen Mejia
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