Defiance and danger: The case of Afro-Colombian leaders since the signing of the peace agreement.

Francia Márquez, Temistocles Machada & Fredman Herazo.

Colombia has had a long history of violence dating back to the times of its independence. In 2016, the Colombian government signed a peace agreement with the country’s largest guerrilla force, the FARC, to raise hopes of a more peaceful environment throughout the country. However, several other illegal groups remained active in illegal trafficking and conflict with one another, and the result is that “post-conflict” Colombia remains a country of conflict and violence. Colombia is suffering various conflicts due to tensions between illegal groups and the role of the authorities in responding to this, but people do not know that the worst conflict is related to what is happening to the social leaders in the country. This problem has specifically affected the marginalized regions with their communities. Thus, this text will focus on the Afro- Colombian community after the post-agreement in the national context and their challenges. It will then analyse the situation in the regional context, especially the Caribbean and Pacific regions, and finally the impact of the implications and recommendations regarding this situation.

Social leaders and human rights defenders have long faced threats and danger in Colombia, but this recent wave of near constant assasination of social leaders increased notably in the years leading up to, and increasingly since the signing of the agreement in 2016. This violence can be attributed to the absence of state power in the forgotten areas of Colombia; ergo rural areas where armed groups responded to the demobilisation of the FARC by seeking to control the territory, and in many cases illicit economies, which the FARC previously governed, highlighting the state’s power vacuum in these areas. However, the crisis has been particularly damaging for social leaders and human rights defenders in these territories of conflict, especially those who work with marginalized sectors which oppose certain practices, legal and illegal, in these territories.

In this context, to understand what a social leader is, it is necessary to know about the overall national level. First of all, “social leadership is a type of authority granted to some people by the community: it’s based upon a reputation earned over time” (Stodd & Loudon, 2017, p. 6). Secondly, regarding the situation of violence against leaders in Colombia, it has been reported that since 2016, over 400 human rights defenders have been killed in the country (Human Rights Watch, 2020). It is important to note that other organisations that are based in Colombia, such as Somos Defensores and Indepaz, place the figure as over 800, with the variable attributed to differences in the verification capacity. The reports of the killings are occurring principally in regions devastated by the armed conflict and post agreement such as Cauca, Nariño and Antioquia. Furthermore, according to our case of study, Afro-Colombian leaders, there were 18 such leaders murdered between 2016 and 2020 (Human Rights Watch, 2020). What is clear is that representing the rights of marginalized communities, such as indigenous, peasant and Afro-Colombian leads to danger for many leaders in our country.

In these contexts, there is little support from the State and by standing up for their communities, leaders such as Afro-Colombian leaders face the threat of violence if they are seen as an obstacle to the interests of illegal groups in the area in relation to illicit economies, or the interests of local and national elites in relation to private economic affairs. These communities have historically been at risk of violence. Much of their current marginalisation can be traced to the legacy of colonialism, but in the current situation, a sizable percentage of the Afro-Colombian population are affected by high levels of poverty and are situated in forgotten areas of Colombia (Amnesty International, 2020). This population is found throughout the country, but particularly in departments such as Choco, the most populous Afro-Colombian state, followed by Magdalena, Bolivar and Sucre. With the signing of the peace agreement in 2016, which included a specific Ethnic chapter aimed at addressing historic victimisation of particular communities, there was hope that Afro-Colombian communities could assume a greater role in social, political and economic participation in these long marginalized regions. Nevertheless, the situation has worsened since the agreement in 2016; a product of the state failing to fill the void of the FARC in many territories, increased presence of competing illegal actors, including dissident FARC groups, and a general lack of commitment on behalf of the Duque government in supporting the agreement, especially in terms of projects related to victims rights such as land restitution. The challenges are clear because of the lack of evidence for the existence of the state in those rural areas of the country, where the investment in the region is more related to the development or protection of mega-projects rather than the social and economic development of the Afro-Colombian communities. This is a problem about interests, because the presence of entities seeking access to the rich minerals found in many of these regions, in addition to the previously mentioned presence of illegal groups (The Clan del Golfo/AGC, Caparros, FARC dissidents and the ELN to name but a few) means that defending the interests of these communities also means defending the natural resources of these territories on which communities depend. When these communities try to speak up for their rights, the lack of true institutional presence means that they face the very same human rights violations which they are supposed to report on.

Although many Colombians live in isolated rural areas and as communities need to defend their lands and human rights, they have  strategies of cooperation within and between their communities. Furthermore, Afro leaders represent their communities interests in a complicated context, as mentioned above. That is why many face the threat of violence simply for  promoting the cause of Afro-Colombian communities. One example of Afro-Colombian leadership this is the entity Procesos de Comunidades Negras, which provides  a means of representation and political participation based on their cultural identity (Americas Quarterly, 2012) and whose objective is to enhance the interests of an ethnic society that has been historically disparate. The very survival of Afrodescendant  communities in some cases can be a challenge without the existence of such organisations. One prominent leader affiliated with PCN is Francia Marquez, who won the Goldman Environmental Prize in 2018 and was named in the BBC’s 100 most influential women in the world list in 2019. Francia works in defense of the environment, women’s rights and the rights of her community. She is planning to stand as a candidate in the 2022 presidential election. In similar ways,  Afro-Colombian leaders may be affiliated to groups whose responsibility is to represent marginalised Afro communities in relation to specific issues. For instance, there are many prominent voices of Afro-Colombian leaders in the Association of Displaced Afrocolombians (The Association of Displaced Afrocolombians, or Afrodes). In fact, many of the challenges faced by these communities can be seen in the case of Buenaventura, a city on the Pacific coast  of Colombia whose port is vital to the nation’s economy and which is a strategic zone for both legal and illegal interests in the country. According to Amnesty International (2020): “through infrastructure works, in particular the existing ports in the city, or through violence that harms them, threatens the continued existence of the Afro-descendant town of Buenaventura because of people leaving the territory or living in very precarious conditions” (p. 16). Those working to defend community interests in Buenaventura therefore face a very real threat of violence due to the interests of other actors in the region.

One example of the dangers faced by leaders, and the particular case of being a leader in a context such as Buenaventura, is the case of Temistocles Machado, who was an Afro- Colombian social leader. For many years he fought for the rights of Afro-Colombian communities in his native Buenaventura. In 2018, he was killed because of his work in defense of his community and their territory. Temistocles had been constantly threatened because he fought for his territory and his people. The Colombian government’s response about the killing of social leaders has always been to militarize as much as possible the territory in which these killings take part. However, this response is not as effective as it should be because people continue dying at the hands of illegal groups.

While departments such as Choco and Cauca have seen particularly high numbers of attacks on Afro leaders, the situation is repeated throughout the country, and the Caribbean region is no different.

The Colombian Caribbean region is located in the north of the country and for many years has been the connection with different parts of the world, thanks to its ports and important port cities (Cartagena, Barranquilla and Santa Marta)  that are there. However, it is important to mention that the region has enormous structural problems in terms of social inequalities present throughout the territory. Furthermore, an important factor is that in Colombia, power is traditionally centralized which means that some areas of the Caribbean  lead to power vacuums as is the case of departments such as Choco. The struggle of the social leaders present in the Colombian Caribbean has been characterized by the eradication of the inequalities present in this territory and the fight against political corruption; like the one that exists in major cities and helps exacerbate the lack of state presence. Similarly, the Caribbean region too has a high presence of illegal actors and illegal economies.

In the Caribbean region, there are similar dynamics to elsewhere in the country which create danger for human rights defenders. The southern regions of the departments of Cordoba, Bolivar and Cesar, as well as the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta mountain range are all areas that historically suffered during the armed conflict, and are also regions with a poor state presence coupled with the presence of illegal groups and illegal activities. One such area that suffered dramatically during the worst years of violence is the Montes de Maria area which stretches across parts of Sucre and Bolivar. Within this traditionally marginalized region is the town of San Basilio de Palenque, which represents an area of Bolivar recognized for being a town mainly made up of Afro-Colombians, founded in the 17th century by escaped slaves and considered as the “first free town in the Americas”. However, it has also faced acts  of violence for many years throughout the armed conflict. It is an area which faces the challenge of poverty and has traditionally received little assistance from the state. However, it is an incredibly important town in terms of identity, language and culture of Afro-Colombian communities, and as such many of its inhabitants are prominent among cultural organisations and other ethnic associations. In a region where those promoting minority rights are viewed with suspicion, this work too can mean danger. A case to exemplify the struggle of social leaders in the Caribbean is the case of Palenquero leader named Fredman Herazo Padilla. Fredman studied law and history and was a cultural manager and social leader of the San Basilio de Palenque community since he was a child. He became one of the most important speakers of the Palenquero language and also carried out different work for the Colombian Caribbean community, visiting many parts of the country to discuss the cultural characteristics, history and rights of black communities. Fredman was shot dead at a restaurant while visiting the south of Córdoba to talk with Afro communities in the region about issues of cultural heritage. This subregion is a disputed zone by various illegal actors such as the Clan del Golfo (AGC) and the Caparros, and is also the most deadly zone for those working in defense of human rights in the Caribbean region. The situation is not at all surprising in this country. According to the data of numerous entities and NGOs, Colombia is the country in Latin America where social leaders and defenders of human rights are most assassinated.

Another case which symbolizes the threat throughout the country is that of Bernardo Cuero, who was an Afro-Colombian leader from Tumaco, towards the south of Colombia’s Pacific coast. Bernardo had been displaced from Tumaco due to the armed conflict, and had relocated to the Caribbean department of Atlantico, where he later became a member of the Mesa de Víctimas Del Atlántico (Atlantico Victim’s Board) and was part of Afrodes. He had asked for protection from the state and had it until 2016, when it was removed from him because the state argued that his state of risk was ordinary and not in need of formal protection. In 2017 he was killed. Bernardo, like far too many other social leaders, received multiple life threats throughout his journey as an Afro-Colombian leader. Sadly, these threats were eventually acted on. Bernardo’s case bears certain similarities to another high profile case of violence against the Afro-Colombian community. In June 2019, mother of three Maria del Pilar Hurtado was shot dead in Tierralta, Córdoba. Maria del Pilar, like Bernardo, had fled violence elsewhere in the country (Cauca in her case). In Tierralta, Maria del Pilar had been representing her community in their efforts to build houses on land which was in the name of a prominent local politician. Rather than negotiate with the community, riot police were called to remove the housing and in the days that followed, 3 representatives of the community were murdered. This situation may have ended had a video of Maria del Pilar’s son crying beside his mother’s body not circulated on social media, forcing the public to confront the wave of violence faced by Colombia’s marginalised communities.

In response to this failure of the government to protect social leaders, the Colombian government has received recommendations from local, national and international organisations. According to UNCaribe (2020), the Colombian state should: promote social media campaigns showing the work that these social leaders do and the importance it has for the protection of these communities; improve the Unidad Nacional De Protección (National Protection Unit) by financing it and making it more functional; involve local mayors and governors of the affected territories and establish coordination between local, national and regional authorities. These recommendations are echoed by other entities such as the UN and share one recommendation in particular: the Colombian government should fill the power vacuum from an institutional perspective as that is the main reason why these illegal groups take power in these territories and are able to get away with murdering anyone seen as an obstacle to their wishes.

In conclusion, the killing of social leaders, including  Afro-colombian leaders is a a far too common issue in Colombia, and each year the numbers goes up and up. The Colombian  state  has failed in the attempt of protecting these communities and their territories. The problem is that the Colombian state is not truly  present in many of the areas that are affected by these illegal groups. Afro-Colombian leaders deserve the adequate protection of their rights and land; this  should be guaranteed by the Colombian state and its authorities. The Colombian state must act in cooperation with the social leaders and give them the necessary protection because their lives are being constantly threatened and sadly taken. It should also listen to, and act upon, the advice of international organisations such as the  UN, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty international and many others.

*Article written by Sebastian Barreto, Claudio Cantillo & Diego Chima.

References

Americas Quarterly. (2012). Afro-Colombian Leaders: Recognition of Race and the Struggle to Realize Change. https://www.americasquarterly.org/fulltextarticle/afro-colombian-leaders-recognition-of-race-and-the-struggle-to-realize-change/

Amnesty International (2020). Report on human rights defenders in Colombia. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR2330092020ENGLISH.PDF

Human Rights Watch. (2021). Left Undefended. https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/02/10/left-undefended/killings-rights-defenders-colombias-remote-communities

Minority Rights Group. (2021). Afro-Colombians. https://minorityrights.org/minorities/afro-colombians/

Stood, J. & Loudon, J (2017). Social Leadership. Training & Development. https://www.aitd.com.au/

Trejos Rosero, F. L. & Badillo Sarmiento, R. (2020). Report on four conflict zones of Caribbean region. Documento N° 37. UNCaribe. https://www.uninorte.edu.co/documents/12067923/14752905/Los+cuatro+conflictos+del+Caribe+-+Informe+del+primer+semestre+(2020).pdf/6babd784-dec2-4b44-a1b5-d49b9c02de90