Córdoba's crop substitution leaders continue to be murdered having banked on change.

Rural leader Jorge Luis Jaraba Plata was the 62nd social leader murdered in the department of Córdoba since the 2016 peace agreement was signed with the FARC. Like the majority of social leaders targeted in the Caribbean department, Jorge Luis had been attached to the PNIS crop substitution program.

*Article written by Mayda Campo, Dalgys Carbal & Luisa Riondo

The armed conflict in Colombia, well-known as “La Violencia”, is a phenomenon that has permeated the relations between the State and its citizens. According to Vargas and Caruso (2014), this circle of violence in Colombia transcends decades, since the independence war, the conflict between liberals and conservatives, the assassination of the presidential candidate J. E. Gaitan, the birth of guerrilla organizations and right-wing paramilitaries, and drug trafficking ties with the violence. Thus, Colombian authors, such as Melamed (2018) have said that the armed conflict in the country is difficult to define since the dynamics of execution, localization and causality tend to change depending on the period in which the conflict is studied. In particular, the conflict actors have transformed the scope of this one: according to Tate (2001) at the time of writing, Colombian paramilitary groups were “responsible for major drug trafficking operations and the majority of political violence” (pp. 163). Furthermore, the FARC guerrilla received financing through these illicit operations. Because of this connection between the illegal groups and the cartels of drug, oligopolies of coercion were established, a situation in which these organizations have simultaneous and overlapping control of the means of coercion necessary to regulate societal transactions in Colombia (Duncan, 2014). In this respect, the violence has directly impacted the civilian population through forced displacement, kidnapping, selected murders and massacres, among others (Riascos & Vargas, 2011). However, it is important to mention that the links between illicit groups and drug trafficking have also affected the civilian population in Colombia: dynamics, such as the cultivation of illicit crops for cocaine, have impacted in the life of campesinos because of the power vacuums that were exploited by these illegal groups in order to control the economy and the social interactions in marginalized zones. On the other hand, illicit crops have also provided a stable income for these marginalized rural dwellers; that is why, according to Norman (2017), this problematic situation remains a key aspect in the conflict, so much so that in the 2016 Peace Agreement, there was a chapter dedicated to the narcotization of the violence in Colombia, and how best to deal with the issue. As an extension of the impact on civil society, the armed conflict has also impacted social activism in Colombia: according to Albarrancín et al (2023), violence against social leaders has grown throughout the conflict, and, even following the peace agreement with the FARC-EP guerrilla organization in 2016. Much of this violence against social activism in Colombia is related to illegal crops and narcotrafficking (Mejía & Restrepo, 2013), since the social leaders represent the interest of the community in replacing illicit crops —as an illegal economic dynamic— which goes against these illegal group's sources of incomes. Hence, the focus in this article on the issue of illegal crops in Colombia and the ties between the illicit crops substitution program (PNIS) and the violence against social leaders.

The production of illicit crops in Colombia can be traced back to the 1960s when farmers began cultivating coca as a cash crop. The growth of the illicit drug trade in Colombia led to the expansion of coca cultivation and the emergence of other illegal crops such as marijuana and opium poppies. There were several factors that contributed to the growth of illicit crops in the country. One of the main reasons was the high demand for drugs in the United States and Europe. According to Colombia Reports (2023), “the drug labs are generally run by farmers under control of local drug trafficking clans, individual guerrilla units, or associates of the international criminal organizations that traffic the drugs to the US, Europe or the Southern Cone”. Another factor is the poverty and lack of economic opportunities in rural areas of Colombia, leading farmers to turn to coca cultivation as a means of earning stable income and supporting their families. Additionally, the power vacuum in some areas of the country, allied to the presence of armed groups, such as guerrilla groups and drug cartels in Colombia has facilitated the growth of illicit crops. These groups provided protection to coca growers and controlled the production, processing, and trafficking of drugs (Palacios, 2012). Besides, according to Mejía and Restrepo (2013): "...the FARC and paramilitaries also fight each other and the state over the control of productive areas for coca cultivation and threaten or attack local populations to gain absolute control of the local cocaine trade. By doing so, these groups earn the rents associated to the control of land suitable for coca cultivation and cocaine production, a scarce and inelastic factor (pp. 5)." Due to this link between the illegal drug economy and the armed conflict in Colombia, the issue was one of immense importance when the Colombian government was negotiating with the FARC guerrillas during the mandate of Juan Manuel Santos.

The PNIS crop substitution program was created as part of the implementation of the Final Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace, signed by the government and the FARC guerrillas in 2016. Likewise, Decree Law 896 of 2017 defines the objective of the PNIS as «to promote the voluntary substitution of illicit crops, through the development of programmes and projects to contribute to overcoming conditions of poverty and marginalisation of peasant families who derive their subsistence from illicit crops» (pp. 5). However, this programme has inadvertently increased the violence against social leaders: the cohesion of the state security apparatus, and the competition in the illegal market determines traffickers’ incentives to employ violence (Duran, 2015). For instance, according to Llanes (2020), the program’s agreement raised the monthly probability of a social leader’s killing by 1.5 percentage points, representing a 167 % increase, considering that the pre-treatment controls mean was 0.9 %. Findings are robust to several specifications and the identification assumptions are likely to be fulfilled in all econometric models (pp. 4). Essentially, the problem around illegal crops arises from the interest of the social leaders —who have signed up and are part of the PNIS—, who defend the purpose of the programme and reject the violence perpetrated by armed groups. Effectively, by signing up to the crop substitution programs, they have been identified as obstacles to the interests of those who wish to see coca cultivation continue. Besides, Holmes et al (2006) say that there is a “relationship between coca production and guerrilla violence by reviewing national-level data over time and studying Colombia by department, exploring the interactions among guerrilla violence, exports, development, and displacement” (pp. 1). As previously mentioned, the production of coca is concentrated in the territories with less state control, which implies a strong interaction between the actors involved, not only in the cultivation/harvesting processes but also in the extraction and cocaine trafficking. Likewise, these interactions have strong consequences for civil society. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2019) estimate that 80% of homicide victims in the context of the armed conflict in 2018 occurred in municipalities that were affected by coca crops. On the other hand, the greater presence of coca crops is directly related to dynamics such as internal forced displacement, with the inherent effects on the forces of order (murders or injuries), and with terrorist acts, attacks and combats carried out at the municipal level (UNODC, 2019).

Currently, it is estimated that Colombia is the world's largest cocaine producer. According to the annual report by UNODC (2021), 143,000 hectares with coca crops were identified as of December 31, 2020. There were significant increases of coca crops in Antioquia, Córdoba, and Bolívar (nearly 4,800 hectares). This year's records estimate that “Cordoba contributes 50 % of the total number of hectares with coca crops in the buffer zones” (p. 35) and “has the largest departmental increase (30 %) which corresponds to an increase of nearly 3,500 hectares” (p. 93). Despite the problem, there were no interventions to reduce coca cultivation, indicating that there are multiple factors driving the trend. The one program clearly targeting coca cultivation is the PNIS, as agreed in the 2016 peace agreement. Yet, the Colombian state has failed to move quickly enough to enact the terms of this program, leaving those leaders and communities in limbo as different armed actors moved in to replace the demobilised FARC units. In areas where coca is cultivated, there has been a surge in violence against those involved in crop substitution programs. This trend can be most clearly observed in the Caribbean region in the department of Córdoba. In Córdoba and in the illicit crops growing territories, civil society has waged a constant struggle for their rights and autonomy in the face of government policies and pressure from illegal armed groups. These communities are trapped in a cycle of violence and poverty, being stigmatized as drug producers and being victims of the violence generated by drug trafficking. However, the communities have managed to resist and organize themselves, demanding the recognition of their land rights, the protection of their leaders and the search for sustainable economic alternatives that allow them to escape the stigma. However, in many cases, these leaders are victims of political violence, both from illegal armed groups and drug cartels, since they see them as obstacles to their interests and illegal activities.

To highlight the situation faced by social leaders, and those involved in crop substitution, it is important to look at two important cases of murdered social leaders which took place in Córdoba. The first case was that of Andrés Alfonso Arteaga Cuadrado, a beneficiary of the PNIS program and member of the Asociación Campesina para el Desarrollo del Alto Sinú, a development association aimed at rural communities in the Alto Sinu region (Asodecas for its initials in Spanish). Andres Alfonso had previously been forced to flee his home in Tierralta Córdoba because of threats from armed groups. On the afternoon of January 7th, 2023, the body of this leader was found on the road outside the municipality of Palmira, Córdoba. According to Asodecas, at 6 pm on January 6th, some armed men had intercepted him and vilely murdered him with three gunshot wounds. Although those responsible for the homicide have not been identified, the Clan del Golfo, an armed group with a presence in all the municipalities of the department, is suspected. Within a month, the community in Tierralta and Asodecas had lost yet another leader. Jorge Luis Jaraba Plata was recognized for his leadership in Asodecas and, like Andres Arteaga, was also a beneficiary of the PNIS. Furthermore, he was a member of the conciliation committee of the village of El Juli, in rural Tierraalta. On February 4th, 2023, at 2:00 in the afternoon, the body of this social leader was found in the Aguas Vivas sector. According to the information collected, Jorge Luis Jaraba Plata had received five bullet wounds after being tortured by his attackers (La Primicia, 2023). The grim murder of Jorge Luis was the 1,421st case of a murdered social leader since 2016. As noted above, both Andrés Arteaga and Jorge Jaraba had been affiliated to Asodecas and had also been also beneficiaries of the PNIS crop substitution program, established as part of the 2016 peace deal with the FARC guerrillas. In Asodecas, they had been dedicated leaders of their community in the process of community articulation of peasant society after a period of intense violence dating back to the 1960s. As mentioned, part of their responsibility representing their community was their support for the PNIS, which seeks the voluntary substitution of illicit crops. This objective is sought by developing programs and projects that help to overcome the conditions of poverty and marginalization of peasant families who derive their livelihood from the cultivation of illicit crops (Infobae, 2023). The killings of Andres and Jorge are but two of the 62 cases of murdered social leaders in the department of Cordoba between October 2016 and April 2023. Most of these cases have included leaders associated with crop substitution programs.

In short, violence in Colombia has been a persistent and complex problem for decades, with multiple factors contributing to its existence. The presence of illegal armed groups, drug trafficking, economic and social inequality, corruption, and the lack of access to justice and basic services have marginalized the population. Although, the Colombian government has implemented various policies and strategies to address the violence, including peace agreements with armed groups and strengthening security in areas, violence remains a significant problem in the country. It is evident that the dynamic of narco-trafficking is a huge factor in this violence. The struggle of social leaders is important in consolidating peace and building a fairer and more equitable society. They play a fundamental role in the vindication of the human rights of the most vulnerable and forgotten by the state. However, in the Colombian context, these groups may face risks and threats, as exemplified by the cases of Andrés Arteaga and Jorge Jaraba in the department of Córdoba. These murders not only generate great pain and suffering in the affected communities but are also an obstacle to safeguarding human rights by the State. Therefore, it is necessary for governments to take concrete measures to protect the life and safety of social leaders, as well as to guarantee justice and reparation for their families and communities. Likewise, the problem of illicit crops, the conflict and the violence, is not only an internal problem, but its consequences expand to the international sphere. This is why it is important to highlight the role of cooperation in the construction of a better society where the protection and guarantee of human rights and basic needs are not just a privilege of few.

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